Chemical reaction causing inaction

This Web only Speakout has not been edited.

Heather Maurer

Monday, April 21, 2008

Shortly after midnight the day before Thanksgiving 2006, an uncontrolled reaction at CAI/Arnel manufacturing facility in Danvers, Massachusetts exploded with the force of a 2000-pound bomb. The chemical blast, detonated in the center of a predominately residential neighborhood, shot a cloud of fire 200 feet into the early morning sky and sent shock waves that damaged or destroyed approximately 100 homes and businesses in the surrounding neighborhood, and shattered windows a quarter-mile away.

Fortunately, the midnight accident did not kill or seriously injure anyone. But not every American community has been so lucky.

In January 2006, one worker was fatally burned and about a dozen others were injured when a powerful explosion devastated the Synthron Inc. chemical manufacturing facility in Morganton, North Carolina. A March

2005 explosion at an oil refinery in Texas City, Texas killed fifteen workers and injured 180 others at the plant and in the community. Three months earlier, the release of deadly chlorine gas from a chemical tank in Graniteville, South Carolina killed ten people and sent 250 to the hospital with burned lungs.

Another dangerous chemical reaction is happening on Capitol Hill. Every time Congress tries to protect workers and communities from avoidable chemical threats, the reaction from the chemical and oil industries is to resist. In 2006, the industry’s vitriolic opposition killed two promising bipartisan bills to create a comprehensive chemical plant security program.

There are more than 14,000 chemical facilities across the country.

According to government figures, 100 of these facilities each put more than 1 million people at risk of death or serious injury. Another 445 facilities each endanger 100,000 or more. In Colorado, there are 26 facilities that endanger more than ten thousand people.

The incidents cited above were accidents, but security experts have consistently identified chemical facilities as attractive and vulnerable terrorist targets. Stephen Flynn, a former homeland security advisor for the U.S. Commission on National Security, described chemical facilities as “the equivalent of weapons of mass destruction pre-positioned in some of the most congested parts of our country.”

How can the United States best reduce chemical plant safety and security threats? Any coherent solution must make use of American ingenuity and place these facilities on a path to replacing inherently dangerous chemical processes with safer and more secure technologies.

Safer technologies can protect workers and communities by removing or limiting the hazardous chemicals that are the source of danger.

Traditional security measures, such as guards and fences, aren’t guaranteed to prevent a deadly chemical release. If a release does occur, guards and fences won’t protect workers or communities from exposure. Replacing dangerous chemical operations with safer technologies eliminates the source of the threat resulting in chemical facilities that are inherently safer and less attractive targets for terrorists.

Safer substitutes for many dangerous chemicals are readily available.

Some water treatment facilities, chemical companies, oil refineries, electric utilities and fertilizer manufacturers adopted methods to conduct business as usual without relying on dangerous chemicals.

Regrettably, many companies have chosen to disregard available and cost-effective safer technologies. For example, one-third of the nation’s oil refineries still use hydrofluoric acid, a highly toxic gas that burns the lungs and causes suffocation from fluid buildup. All other refineries use safer technologies such as sulfuric acid or solid action catalysts. By not adopting available safer technology alternatives, the recalcitrant refineries needlessly endanger 17 million people.

The magnitude of the chemical plant threat calls for a bold national policy. First, where safer technologies exist and can be feasibly incorporated, chemical facilities should adopt them. Second, employees must be allowed to participate in the development of safety and security measures, not only because they are on the front lines of exposure, but because they possess a more intimate understanding of the facilities where they work and how to make them safer.

In 2006 the House Homeland Security Committee approved a strong bipartisan bill that included safer technologies, worker participation, and other constructive provisions. The chemical industry vigorously opposed the bill and Congress eventually capitulated to the industry’s objections by abandoning the comprehensive legislation in favor of a limited and temporary program.

The weak program Congress adopted was devised by the chemical industry.

As written, the program actually prohibits the government from requiring that specific security measures be implemented. It may also eliminate more protective state and local chemical security and safety laws.

Fortunately, the House Homeland Security Committee recently introduced H.R. 5577 to replace this limited temporary program with a comprehensive chemical security program.

We deserve better than a hollow program that delivers chemical security in name only. To provide meaningful reform, Congress must pass legislation that replaces dangerous chemical operations with feasible safer technologies, and that integrates employee participation in safety and security initiatives. If Congress continues to succumb to a corrosive chemical industry, it will be at the expense of worker and community safety.

Heather Maurer is program associate at CoPIRG.

• April 21, 2008

  6:59 a.m.

  Suggest removal

  Mike_In_Hartsel writes:

  Heather, admit it. What you really want is for the federal government to run everything because Big Brother knows best. And when I see "employees must be allowed to participate" I look for the Communist flag because that's what you are promoting.

  You neatly present the fear-mongering side of the argument. Alas, me thinks there is something missing.

• April 21, 2008

  8:14 a.m.

  Suggest removal

  pjcoyle writes:

  Mike_in_Hartsel:

  Name calling is always an effective argument.

  Heather:

  In some ways you understate the problem. Over 35,000 chemical facilities registered with DHS earlier this year because they had more than a minimum amount of selected highly dangerous chemicals on site. DHS is doing something about the chemical facility security issue.

  HR 5577 is a step forward as it makes the current temporary program permanent. It also removes some of the restrictions that DHS is currently operating under.

  The issue of employee involvement in the security discussion is a bit of a red herring. I worked in a chemical plant for 16 years as a technician and a chemist. Every time we did a safety review of a product or process we had at least one hourly employee present during the review. While their input was benificial, they brought no special insight into the deliberations. They should be included in safety and security deliberations just because they are another set of eyes and potential source of ideas.

  For further information see my blog at http://journals.aol.com/chemplantsec/...

• April 22, 2008

  3:43 a.m.

  Suggest removal

  roger44 writes:

  ONE hourly worker present? You're kidding right? I worked in a chemical plant and most in management didn't have a clue of the hazards. My current employer has been fined $15,000 by OSHA, and still is not in compliance. In Sparks NV. a plant blew up and They had to identify employees by the bits of flesh they found (DNA) scattered around. Get down in the trenches for a couple of months so you can see first hand the hazards before you claim it's safe.